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*Bank of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda, **Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Faculty of Management,
University of Bournemouth, Bournemouth, UK, †School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT Uganda implemented public expenditure and revenue management reforms from the early 1990s
with specific aims of improving budget planning and aligning aid with fiscal priorities. The dynamic relationship
between aid and domestic fiscal aggregates is analysed using a Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive model with
annual data for 1972–2008 and quarterly data for 1997–2014. Aid has been a significant element of long-run
fiscal equilibrium, associated with increased tax effort and public spending and reduced domestic borrowing.
Fiscal reforms have improved aid and expenditure management, contributing to improved fiscal performance in
Uganda, with lessons for other African countries.
1. Introduction
Fiscal response models offer important insights into how donors could expect their aid to impact
on the fiscal behaviour of a recipient government, in particular how aid affects government
spending, tax revenue and domestic borrowing. In principal, because most of the aid that is
spent in a country goes to or through the government, or finances the provision of public goods
and services that would otherwise place demands on the budget, aid is a fundamental component
of public sector fiscal behaviour (Morrissey, 2015a). Aid inflows are expected to be associated
with a direct and significant effect on public spending, but may also affect taxation either because
of influences on tax effort or because reforms linked to aid conditionality affect tax rates or the tax
base (Morrissey, 2015b). Aid may be associated with lower domestic borrowing where this is an
element of donor conditionality. This paper investigates the impact of aid on fiscal behaviour in
Uganda.
Uganda is an interesting case for studying the fiscal effects of aid as significant aid inflows
have supported government spending for over 25 years in an environment of low tax revenue. It is
also important as a country that implemented major fiscal and expenditure management reforms in
the 1990s; as the budgetary importance increased the government became more concerned with
recording aid properly and incorporating it into fiscal planning. ‘Since the mid-1990s the govern-
ment of Uganda has encouraged donors to shift the composition of aid away from project aid and
towards budget support so that the use of aid could be better aligned with its own priorities at the
macro/fiscal, sectoral and intra-sectoral levels’ (Brownbridge, 2010, p. 278). Thus, one expects to
see that aid was an important influence on the budget process, especially spending, and that fiscal
management has improved since the mid-1990s. One aim of the paper is to explore this
empirically.
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A particular problem faced by recipient governments in incorporating aid into budgetary processes is
that not all aid that flows into a country is recorded by the government; aid directed to the budget is known
but recipients have incomplete information about aid delivered through donor projects. Uganda is no
exception, and is in fact a good exemplar of the issues and how they can be addressed. Themix of aid in the
form of budget support and donor projects presents particular problems for incorporating aid in budget
planning as only the former is fully recorded (while the latter can create future spending commitments).
The Bank of Uganda did record disbursements of project loans but did not routinely record the larger flows
in the form of project grants so a significant proportion of aid did not appear in the budget (Brownbridge,
2010). During the 1990s Uganda implemented a series of reforms to improve the incorporation of aid into
budget and expenditure planning. Although the importance of aid declined in the 2000s, total donor
support (both direct budget support and project aid) averaged about 43 per cent of the national budget over
the 2003/4–2008/9 period (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), 2009).
This study evaluates the fiscal effects of aid in Uganda over the period 1972–2008 using annual data
and also over 1997–2014 using quarterly data. Annual data correspond to the annual budget cycles but
the available donor measure of aid disbursements overstates aid to the budget and the deflator
employed is not available for recent years (see Section 3). The advantages of the quarterly data are
that aid is measured by the MoFPED, and should be closer than the donor measure to aid recorded in
the budget, and it permits analysis of the recent period when fiscal planning and recording of aid by
the government had been improved. The quarterly data are not available before 1997 and a potential
disadvantage is that they may not correspond fully with an annual budget planning cycle.
One strand of the empirical literature on the impact of aid on the fiscal behaviour of recipients is
concerned with fungibility. Aid is said to be fungible if recipients fail to use it in the manner intended by
donors. A concern of donors is that they want aid to finance spending in a particular sector, such as health,
but fungibility reduces the extent to which aid increases spending in that sector (McGillivray & Morrissey,
2004). This is not addressed as the analysis does not consider the composition of spending (and one would
need to know how much aid donors intend to be spent on particular areas of spending to assess if the aid is
fungible). Concern here is with the effects of aid on total fiscal aggregates, the other strand of the literature.
Fiscal response models (FRMs) adopt a broader approach allowing for the dynamic effect of aid on
expenditure, tax revenue and domestic borrowing. The traditional framework is based on the assumption
that the government maximises utility based on a quadratic loss function subject to targets for each
revenue and expenditure category (Franco-Rodriguez, McGillivray, & Morrissey, 1998). There are many
limitations of empirical applications of FRMs, mostly related to difficulties in the use and estimation of
targets, the treatment of aid, and econometric techniques that often yield inconsistent estimates of core
parameters (McGillivray & Morrissey, 2004). Furthermore, the theoretical framework does not provide a
thorough representation of government behaviour, such as explaining how the targets are determined.
In an effort to overcome many of these difficulties, there is now a growing body of empirical
literature estimating the FRM within a cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) framework, which
provides a tractable framework for the formulation and testing of hypotheses for links between aid and
domestic fiscal variables. The CVAR takes into account the interactions between variables over time,
allowing a distinction between the long-run (equilibrium) and short-run (adjustment to the equili-
brium) relations. There is one equation for each and every variable, so all variables in the system are
treated as potentially endogenous and each variable is explained by its own lags and lagged values of
the other variables. Assumptions about exogeneity are tested directly, avoiding the need for strong a
priori assumptions; by design the econometric model allows the data to identify the statistical relation-
ship between variables (Juselius, 2006). It is therefore an atheoretical approach in the sense that one
does not have to maintain the existence of, estimate or test specific theoretical formulations of the
budget planning targets, or to estimate structural parameters. Rather, economic theory is invoked to
choose the variables to include in the analysis, select the appropriate normalisations and restrictions to
identify particular effects (hypotheses), and to interpret the results. Data requirements are also
relatively modest, although as is the case here, obtaining consistent data over a sufficiently long
sample period to facilitate reliable estimation may be an issue. In an effort to overcome this, we
estimate CVAR models using both annual and quarterly data.
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Surveys and discussions of the literature on the country-specific fiscal effects of aid using a CVAR
approach are provided in Morrissey (2015a). These include the first CVAR study, Osei, Morrissey, and
Lloyd (2005) for Ghana, the earlier version of which (Morrissey, Osei, & Lloyd, 2002) informed the
method applied in the Fagernäs and Roberts (2004) study of Uganda; Morrissey, M’Amanja, and Lloyd
(2007) for Kenya; Martins (2010) and Mascagni and Timmis (2016) for Ethiopia. It is clear that the impact
of aid is country specific but this should not be surprising as governments differ in their fiscal behaviour.
Section 2 discusses the evolution of budget policy in Uganda since independence, in particular
improvements in public financial management and how aid is incorporated into expenditure planning
since the late 1980s. The data and econometric methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses
the empirical results. The conclusions and policy implications are in Section 5.
2. Aid and the evolution of fiscal management in Uganda
In the context of the role of aid and donors in the budgetary and fiscal policy process it is helpful to
distinguish three broad phases for Uganda. The period from independence in 1962 until 1986 was
characterised by political and economic instability with low levels of aid, domestic revenue and
expenditure. The first 10 years or so under President Museveni (1986–1997) was a period of active
economic reform and rehabilitation with marked improvements in fiscal policy and processes and
significant increases in aid as Uganda became something of a darling of the donor community. The
aid/GDP share increased from a low of about 1 per cent in 1980 to about 5 per cent in 1986, reaching a
peak of about 19 per cent in 1992, and averaged about 11 per cent between 1990 and 2006 (Egesa, 2011).
Since about 1997 Uganda has had strong public financial management systems, at least by sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) standards, and a more coherent budget and expenditure management system with efforts to
improve the identification and incorporation of aid inflows into fiscal planning. Although 1997 is by no
means a ‘hard’ dividing year as many of the important reforms were initiated earlier, the public financial
management reforms were coming to fruition around then so we will use these three phases.
2.1. The years of instability: 1962–1986
Economic performance was good following independence in 1962, benefitting from being part of
the East African Community (with Kenya and Tanzania). This lasted until about 1965, as increas-
ing state intervention and a growing public sector began to take a toll on the economy while
tensions on access to rents across ethnic and regional divisions contributed to political instability.
In effect, ‘Obote played one institution off another for political survival’ (Atingi-Ego & Kasekende,
2007, p. 259). The army became the instigator of instability in the late 1960s, culminating in Idi
Amin taking power in 1971.
The Ugandan economy was unstable and at best stagnant during the 1970s and the first half of
the 1980s under the Idi Amin regime (1971–1979) and the less notorious but no less destructive
second regime of Milton Obote in the early 1980s. Aid inflows were low, mostly provided by the
World Bank and declined dramatically by the late 1970s (Kasekende & Atingi-Ego, 1999). An
IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme introduced in 1981 helped to stabilise and
improve the economy but collapsed in 1984, largely because the dramatic increase in the fiscal
deficit and inflation violated the conditionality of the programme (Loxley, 1989). The Obote
government was removed in a military coup in 1984 leading to a period of economic chaos until
the National Resistance Movement under the leadership of President Yoweri Museveni took power
in January 1986.
2.2. The years of recovery: 1986–1996
The Museveni regime inherited an economy with almost two decades of impoverishment and
instability. With support from the World Bank and IMF, Uganda implemented an ambitious economic
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liberalisation programme which, by 1992, restored macroeconomic stability. The economic reform
programme helped to revive GDP growth such that, given the geographical disadvantages and limited
natural resources, Uganda was considered an economic success case by the mid-1990s (Atingi-Ego &
Kasekende, 2007). The success restored investor confidence and signalled a strong political commit-
ment to the reform programmes (Collier & Reinikka, 2001), which in turn encouraged donors to
increase support.
During the 1980s, most aid was in the form of concessional loans associated with World Bank and IMF
programmes, and often given as import or balance of payments support. Although the specific intention
was providing foreign currency to finance trade deficits and avoid import compression, the Bank of
Uganda sterilised the inflow and the government benefited from the domestic currency equivalent. Rising
coffee prices and the flexible exchange rate regime after 1993 supported improvements in the balance of
payments and reduced the need for aid to plug the trade deficit so very little aid was provided for import
support by 1997. However, this had no specific effect on integrating aid into the budget as import and
budget (general or sector) support are essentially the same: each enhances the ‘budget resource envelope’
in the same way, through the Bank of Uganda converting the foreign currency inflow into domestic
currency and crediting the treasury account (Brownbridge, 2010, p. 279). Thus, although import support
declined as budget support grew, a significant proportion of aid entered the budget and was recorded as
such (on-budget aid).
Once the government under Museveni had established its credentials and competence bilateral donors
were also keen to offer support; aid increased from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 1986/87 to 13.8 per cent by
1992/93, and financed about 80 per cent of public investment (Whitworth, 2010, p. 132). Grants from
bilateral donors assumed increasing importance in the early 1990s, but this was mostly in the form of
project aid and was inadequately incorporated in budget planning (often referred to as off-budget aid).
Given the very weak capacity inMinistries, this created severe pressure on administration, compounded by
the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Finance (responsible for aid loans and the recurrent
budget) and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (responsible for aid grants and the
development budget), in particular because the latter had limited information on aid projects (primarily for
capital spending, hence relevant to the development budget). The government lacked information so that
‘in Uganda in 1991 roughly half of the resources available for public expenditure were being allocated by
government through the budget process, while decisions regarding the other half were being made
individually by donors’ (Whitworth, 2010, p. 136). Furthermore, the former were on-budget and largely
for recurrent spending whereas the latter were mostly off-budget for development spending.
A particular problem arose with off-budget donor projects because they required some matched
funding (counterpart funds, typically 10–20% of project cost) from public spending; as projects were
at best only partially captured in budgets in the early 1990s, the government underestimated spending
commitments. ‘What was surprising is that the responsible donors failed to monitor the rapidly rising
stock of counterpart funding they were imposing on Uganda’ (Whitworth, 2010, p. 135). Fiscal control
was weak in the late 1980s, culminating in a notable deficit in 1991/92 as no offsetting reductions
were made in expenditures despite a shortfall in domestic revenue and on-budget aid. The government
financed the deficit through domestic borrowing which generated high inflation and macroeconomic
instability. This marked a turning point in Uganda’s fiscal policy with an increased focus on fiscal
discipline and budgeting within a medium-term macro framework (Fagernäs & Roberts, 2004). Some
donors, especially the World Bank, recognised their contribution to the fiscal problems and responded
to requests to postpone counterpart funds, either by covering the entire project costs or accepting
related sector spending in lieu (Whitworth, 2010, p. 149).
In 1992 the two Ministries were merged into the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development (MoFPED), with a clear mandate to enforce fiscal discipline in budget planning and
execution. This was an important first step in reform of fiscal administration and the MoFPED
established effective control over the budget process and improved revenue estimation, with much
tighter control over spending ministries’ commitments and disbursements than had been exercised
previously. Uganda was one of the first countries to introduce an effective medium-term expenditure
framework (MTEF), an annually updated three-year rolling expenditure plan, formulated to be
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consistent with fiscal targets for macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline incorporating expendi-
ture proposals prepared by sector ministry working groups in which the main donors were invited to
participate. The MTEF became ‘a framework for linking policy formulation with budget allocations
[. . .] a tool for policy based budgeting’ (Brownbridge, Federico, & Kuteesa, 2010, p. 173). The aim
was to ensure that expenditures were consistent with the resource envelop and that government levels
of domestic borrowing from the domestic market were kept within levels compatible with low and
stable inflation. Thus, for example, the aim was to constrain spending so as not to exceed the target
deficit given revenue expectations implying that the government was better able to manage the budget
process.
Expenditure planning and management was improved through the early 1990s, but there were
more difficulties on the revenue side. Uganda’s tax performance was poor even by SSA standards,
with the tax/GDP ratio increasing from a mere 5.8 per cent over 1985–1990 to only 7.8 per cent
over 1991–1996 compared to an average over the whole period of about 16 per cent for non-oil
SSA countries (Cawley & Zake, 2010, p. 104, Table 5.1). The underlying problem was a limited
tax base as, after decades of instability, the private business and wage employment sector was
small while trade liberalisation reforms reduced potential revenue from export taxes and tariffs. A
semi-autonomous Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was established in 1991 with the aim of
improving tax collection and increasing revenue, but there was no observable impact over the first
few years. Tax revenue remained relatively stagnant during the first half of the 1990s. There was
more success on aid, both through increasing inflows and implementing measures to accurately
capture project aid in budget and expenditure planning, with improved monitoring and tracking of
public expenditure on social sectors identified as priority (pro-poor and donor-supported) areas
(Whitworth, 2010, p. 141–3).
A close relationship existed between Uganda and donors as aid was very important in supporting
both the decision to reform and the nature of reforms; conditionality did play a role, initially
creating pressure for reform but as the 1990s progressed it supported officials who were committed
to reform. The evolution of the MTEF is an example as initially the process was supported by
technical assistance and encouragement from donors but as it developed it reassured donors that
expenditure planning was in place and made it easier for MoFPED to monitor spending by line
ministries. The MTEF was fully incorporated into the budget process by 1998 and ensured that
once the aggregate expenditure ceiling was determined ‘the macroeconomic objectives of fiscal
policy are paramount and are not compromised to meet demands for higher expenditures’
(Brownbridge et al., 2010, p. 182). Thus, by about 1997 the major public financial management
reforms were in place and major steps had been implemented to ensure that aid inflows were
captured in budget planning.
2.3. The years of consolidation: 1997–2014
The practice of allocating project and programme aid receipts to the development budget regardless of
whether the intended purpose was of a capital or recurrent nature changed after 1998 under the MTEF
process, with increasing use of programme and output budgeting and a re-orientation of expenditure in
line with the national poverty reduction strategy (MoFPED, 2005). Aid became linked to debt relief
and budget support accounted for an increasing share to support public expenditure to achieve social
and poverty reduction aims, accounting for about a third of total public expenditure by the early 2000s
(Brownbridge, 2010, p. 290). The Government was increasingly concerned with integrating aid into
the budget and stated a preference for budget support over project aid on the basis that ‘different aid
modalities are not equally compatible with efficient budget planning and management and national
ownership of the budget’ (MoFPED, 2003, p. 1).
Following the formalisation of new practices in the Budget Act of 2001, the MTEF and annual
budget processes became one and the same. The MoFPED set cash limits on expenditures consistent
with resource availability and taking into account known commitments and recurrent needs so that
domestic borrowing remained within the levels established in the budget. The government engaged
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donors in a cooperative relationship, where they participated in the formulation of budget framework
papers and the public expenditure process, and monitored progress in quarterly meetings. At the
operational level, donor projects were approved and monitored by a Development Committee in the
MoFPED, whose External Aid department maintained data on aid receipts and expenditures to ensure
that the sector allocation and purpose of aid projects were in line with the MoFPED’s expenditure
strategy (Foster & Mijumbi, 2002). However, this was difficult to achieve in practice given limited
data on project aid. ‘Donor projects, and their funding, are effectively outside the MTEF planning and
thus are not fully integrated into MTEF sector ceilings’ (Brownbridge et al., 2010, p. 195). The
accuracy of recording aid inflows improved throughout the 1990s and so too did fiscal and expendi-
ture planning.
The major tax reform of the period was initiated in 1996 with the introduction of a Value Added Tax
(VAT) as part of a package of reforms intended to increase tax revenue. Tax revenue did increase
gradually, from about 11 per cent of GDP over 1995–2003 to almost 13 per cent by 2007, but this is
attributable to success of the Uganda Revenue Authority rather than increased collection due to VAT
(Cawley & Zake, 2010, p. 109–11). Uganda’s weak revenue collection resulted in a high dependency on
foreign aid. Economic growth, aid inflows and increased domestic revenues contributed to a real increase
in public expenditure since the early 1990s (Brownbridge et al., 2010).
Given the importance of budget support revenues, disbursement delays were a particular concern
during the 1990s as shortfalls had to be financed by domestic borrowing (with offsetting reductions in
Bank of Uganda foreign exchange reserves to prevent an impact on money supply) within the budget
year. ‘Although ex ante estimates of donor project expenditures are captured in the MTEF, donor
disbursement estimates for projects were not initially integrated into sector ceilings in the MTEF, and
accurate ex post expenditure data was never available’ (Brownbridge et al., 2010, p. 191). From the early
2000s a discount factor was applied to budget support commitments to plan for within-year delays. By
the late 2000s, however, recording of aid improved as the importance of aid declined; since 2006, tax
revenues have exceeded aid receipts and aid has accounted for a steadily decreasing share of spending.
In terms of macroeconomic performance and the importance of aid, Uganda was not untypical of
SSA countries since the 1970s. The full period has three broad phases (other SSA countries had
similar phases, if for different years): 1972 to the late 1980s was largely a period of instability and
poor performance; the late 1980s to mid-1990s was the period of economic stabilisation and growth
recovery, with aid playing an increasingly important role; and since the late 1990s Uganda has
exhibited gradual economic consolidation. Changes in economic policy were clearly important and
donors influenced reform efforts, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Data and econometric methodology
To investigate the role of aid in fiscal behaviour, annual (1972–2008) and quarterly (1997Q3 to
2014Q4) time series data in Ugandan Shillings (UGX) reported in constant 2005 prices are used. The
fiscal data on spending, tax revenue and net domestic borrowing from the banking system are from the
MoFPED in constant 2005 prices and recorded in a consistent manner. The non-tax revenue compo-
nent of domestic revenue and other forms of borrowing are omitted from the system so we are not
estimating an identity. The annual aid series is from OECD-DAC (2009), using GDP data from the
Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS, various years) to express aid in 2005 prices. The OECD annual
aid data are available after 2008, but in 2013 constant prices. However, in 2015 Ugandan GDP was
rebased to 2009/10 prices, and while recent GDP data series are in 2009/10 prices, the historical GDP
data has not been consistently rebased (we do not have a number of overlapping years for the GDP and
OECD aid data in different constant prices to ‘splice’ reliably). The quarterly data we use, in contrast,
includes aid and fiscal variables published by the MoFPED in constant 2005 prices (so neither GDP
nor the GDP deflator is required). As there are reasons to suggest that expenditure and budget
planning, and especially the accuracy of recording aid, had improved significantly by 1997 (see
Section 2) it seems sensible to utilise the quarterly data for the recent period. The ability to assess if the
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longer annual series permit the same inferences as the more recent quarterly series addresses concern
that the equilibrium relationship has altered.
In principle, the measure of aid should capture total net disbursements of aid from all donors as
recorded by the government so that it measures aid known to the fiscal authorities and therefore
capable of affecting budget planning. While this should include all on-budget and programme aid, the
appropriate treatment of project aid is complicated as some may be effectively on-budget (such as
sector projects that are known to the government, especially if matching funds are required), some may
be known and influence spending allocations (such as health projects that permit the government to
reduce its own health spending) and some may be genuinely off-budget (such as technical assistance in
an area the government would not otherwise fund). The available aid series do not permit these
distinctions to be made consistently for aid disbursements. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 2,
Ugandan recording of project aid was very partial until the late 1990s and incomplete thereafter. The
analysis in the next section uses total disbursements and when interpreting results it should be
recognised that this over-states the amount of aid known to the budget authorities. The quarterly
data, in contrast, provides a more accurate measure of aid known to the Ugandan authorities (thus the
aid data recorded at annual and quarterly intervals need not correspond exactly over the same year).
The raw data are reported in Figures 1 and 2. Levels were low and relatively persistent until
1988 (coinciding with the start of the Museveni regime) after which spending and revenue
followed a clear upward trend, whilst aid was more volatile (Figure 1). Aid increased dramatically
between 1988 and 1991, declined until 1994 and then increased erratically until 2005. In relative
terms, the donor measure of aid was equivalent to less than 10 per cent of spending through the
1970s, increased steadily through the 1980s and was over 100 per cent of spending over 1989–
1992 (demonstrating that much did not actually go to the government) although it usually ranged
between 60 and 80 per cent of spending until 2005 and then fell below 60 per cent. The quarterly
series are rugged, reflecting a degree of seasonality, with clear upward trends for revenue and
spending but only a slight irregular upward trend for aid (Figure 2). Within years, aid tended to be
highest in the fourth quarter (or sometimes the second) and this was also the case, but less
pronounced, for revenue. Spending tended to peak in the fourth quarter but this was not always
the case. Borrowing was more variable and often negative. Reflecting the better measure, aid was
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equivalent to about 30 per cent of spending in the late 1990s but this had fallen to below 10 per
cent by about 2012.
3.1. The cointegrated VAR (CVAR) model
By exploiting the parallels between the economics and econometrics of fiscal response models we can
assess the role of aid in the budget. From an economic viewpoint aid can be used in the process of
budget planning and/or by relaxing the budget constraint. Where aid forms part of the process of
budgetary planning it may be viewed as having a long-run role, the recipient directly incorporating the
level of aid as a component of the budget. As observed in Section 2, this was certainly the case in
Uganda by the late 1990s. In contrast, aid may simply relax the budget constraint when it is received.
This economic distinction corresponds to the econometric notions of long- and short-run in that the
process of budgetary planning defines an equilibrium relation among the fiscal variables (of which aid
may be one element) and a transitory relaxation in the fiscal constraint akin to a temporary shortfall. In
other words, the cointegrating relation may be thought of as the statistical analogue of the budgetary
equilibrium in fiscal response models. Since the former is a relationship among the levels of fiscal
variables, which are likely to be non-stationary (that is integrated of order one, I(1)), it is clear that for
aid to play a part in budgetary planning it too must be I(1). While the non-stationarity of aid is
necessary for aid to play a role in planning it is not sufficient as there may be institutional factors in the
donor and recipient that prevent aid (even if it is non-stationary) from entering the fiscal equilibrium.
Where aid is I(1) it may potentially play a role in both the long-run process of budgetary planning and
in the short-run as a source of budget finance. However, where aid is I(0) it will not form part of the
fiscal equilibrium relationship as it is too unpredictable (variable year-on-year) to be useful for
planning, and will merely relax the budgetary constraint (that is its role is confined to the short-
run). This underlines the importance of the order of integration of aid as indicating the uses to which
aid can be put in the budget of the recipient. In addition, whether recipients treat the level of aid
received as being exogenous or endogenous affects aid’s role in budget decision-making. If donors
respond to the fiscal conditions in the recipient country when allocating aid, we may interpret this as
evidence that it is endogenous to the fiscal equilibrium.
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The empirical model distinguishes between the long- and short-run responses and tests for
exogeneity – based on a 4-dimensional vector autoregressive model: yʹt = (DBt, Gt, At, Rt), where
(for year t) DB is domestic borrowing, G is government spending (GC for current and GK for
investment), A is aid and R is tax revenue. To facilitate interpretation of the potentially complex
dynamic interactions between the fiscal variables it is convenient to express the CVAR in its error
correcting form which describes how the variables adjust over time. This is given by:
Δyt ¼ αβ0yt1 þ
Xk1
i¼1
ΓiΔyti þΦDt þ εt (1)
where yt is the 4-dimensional vecto of endogenous variables, α and β are (p x r) coefficient matrices,
Γi is a (p x p) matrix of short-run adjustment coefficients, i = 1,. . .,(k-1) is the number of lags included
in the system, Δ is the first difference operator, Dt is (m x 1) vector of m deterministic terms (constants,
linear trends, dummies) and εt is a (p x 1) vector of errors with standard properties. The coefficients in
β describe the fiscal equilibrium (and hence the long-run response to a ceteris paribus change in each
of the variables) and coefficients in α govern the speed at which each variable adjusts following a
shock to the fiscal equilibrium. Coefficients in the Γi matrices allow short-run adjustment in each of
the variables to differ from that given by their long-run rates (defined by the coefficients in α) and
hence, potentially at least, accommodate a wide range of dynamic responses. Note that if k = 1, then
Γi = 0 implying that the long-run response is the same as the short-run. Therefore, having been pushed
away from equilibrium by a change in one of the variables, the system adjusts back to equilibrium
exclusively through α(Juselius, 2006). The appropriate value of the lag length k is empirically
determined using information criteria (see Appendix).
To facilitate exposition of the key hypotheses of interest in the following section, consider the
dynamically simple case where k = 1 in a model with unrestricted constant and r = 1 (so that a fiscal
equilibrium exists). The error correction representation of the CVAR takes the form:
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To provide empirical content to the structural analysis underlying the causal links between aid and
domestic fiscal variables, long-run parameter restrictions are imposed (the method is described in the
Appendix).
3.2. Fiscal hypotheses
Martins (2010) proposes a set of nine testable hypotheses for possible fiscal effects of aid but we limit
attention to four hypotheses to be tested in the CVAR analysis by applying restrictions on the long-run
fiscal βi coefficients in Equation (2) as discussed below. These can be interpreted as tests of the
relationship between variables in the system. Starting from the unrestricted model and ignoring the
constant in the exposition, the unrestricted long-run equilibrium can be represented in the general
form:
β1DB þ β2Gþ β3Aþ β4R ¼ 0 (3)
Provided the variables that comprise Equation (3) are each I(1), cointegration implies that deviations
from the equilibrium in Equation (3) are stationary (I(0)). Note that Equation (3) can be normalised on
any variable, so for example setting β1 = -1 yields:
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DB ¼ β2Gþ β3Aþ β4R (4)
Although Equation (3) and Equation (4) are econometrically identical, Equation (4) may be useful
to consider the effects of other variables on domestic borrowing. This feature can be helpful in
interpreting the tests of alternative hypotheses outlined below.
(1) Aid Spending (β1, β3 = 1)
To assess whether there is a one-for-one relationship between aid inflows and government spending
simply involves testing whether the coefficients enter the equilibrium with equal and opposite effects.
In terms of Equation (3), this requires β3 to be equal and of opposite sign to β2 leaving β1 and β4
unrestricted; this measures the eventual effect of aid on spending keeping revenue and borrowing
constant. This can be most easily seen by normalising on G:
G ¼ β1DBþ Aþ β4R (5)
If the coefficient restriction is upheld, then the full change in aid finds its way into government
spending, keeping borrowing and revenue constant. This is related to the literature on whether or not
aid is spent (Hussain, Berg, & Aiyar, 2009; Killick & Foster, 2007), although in that context aid
spending is defined as a widening of the fiscal deficit excluding aid, and therefore involves the
relationship between aid and the difference between tax revenue and spending. Eifert and Gelb (2005)
observe that recipients may face a suspension of aid if donors do not observe that aid increases
spending. However, spending may not increase by the full amount of the aid, either because some aid
is directed to other uses such as reducing borrowing or because tax receipts decline (the ceteris paribus
assumption does not hold). It may be the case that some of the aid ‘leaks’ (perhaps due to corruption or
inefficiency). Spending can increase by more than the aid if, for example, governments have to match
aid revenue or aid-financed government spending generates subsequent claims on future spending (that
may need to be financed by domestic resources), such as the recurrent costs required to maintain an
investment. The situation where government spending increases by more than the amount of the net
aid inflow has been described as aid illusion, such that officials misperceive and overestimate how
much aid will be received and therefore spend in excess of the budget constraint (McGillivray &
Morrissey, 2001). A similar outcome could be observed if actual aid disbursements are less than
anticipated.
(2) Balanced budget (β1 = 0, β2 = -1, β3 = 1, β4 = 1)
Another hypothesis is that domestic borrowing is not part of the budget balance in equilibrium so
that the government aims to meet expenditure exclusively with domestic tax revenue and aid
(G = A + R). This can be tested with the additional, to (i), restrictions that β1 = 0 and β4 = 1, and
can also be interpreted as a balanced or cash budget hypothesis. If accepted this would imply that
borrowing is only resorted to as a short-run adjustment to a shock to other variables (in which case DB
would not enter the long-run equilibrium relationship).
(3) Revenue displacement (β3 = 1, β4 = -1)
Donors may be concerned that the availability of aid is one reason why tax revenue has remained
low. Aid may reduce tax effort if recipient governments use the extra fiscal space provided by aid to
keep taxes low or reduce tax induced distortions, which may be desirable to crowd-in private
investment (Martins, 2010). The hypothesis that aid displaces tax effort, from Equation (3), is tested
by leaving β1 and β2 unrestricted while restricting β3 and β4 to be equal and of opposite sign.
Essentially this is a test that aid substitutes for tax revenue. Addressing the tax effect associated
with aid tends to be difficult as there can be many effects in opposing directions (Morrissey, 2015b).
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For example, trade liberalisation policies associated with aid conditionality may reduce tax revenue, at
least in the short-run, while donors who recognise this may increase aid to compensate (and encourage
tariff reductions).
(i) Aid and domestic borrowing are substitutes (β1 = -1, β3 = 1)
The hypothesis of whether aid and domestic borrowing are perfect substitutes, from Equation (3), is
tested by restricting β1 and β3 to be equal and of opposite sign while leaving β2 and β4 unrestricted.
This is of interest because governments may treat aid as an alternative to domestic borrowing if
concerned that the latter may deter private investment (by increasing interest rates and/or reducing
domestically available credit). In some cases multilateral institutions, such as the IMF in Ghana (Osei
et al., 2005), may give aid to support conditionality to reduce domestic borrowing.
4. The long-run fiscal effects of aid
The CVAR method and hypotheses tests are implemented using the Cointegration Analysis for Time
Series (CATS) software (Dennis, Hansen, Johansen, & Juselius, 2006). The unrestricted model in
Equation (1) above is estimated with a restricted trend and an unrestricted constant. Including an
unrestricted constant allows for linear trends in both cointegrating space and in the variables in levels,
and produces a non-zero mean in the cointegrating relation. Furthermore, it avoids creating quadratic
trends in the levels, which would arise if both the constant and trend are unrestricted (Juselius, 2006, p.
99–100). As domestic borrowing (DB) was negative in many years a multiplicative model specifica-
tion with a log transformation is not used. Retaining all the series in constant UGX values for the
analysis also allows us to address key questions, such as by how much would the level of government
spending change following an aid injection of one million UGXs? A lag length of one is selected for
annual data and three lags for quarterly data on the basis of standard model selection criteria and is
consistent with the expectation that aid’s impact on the budget is likely to be contemporaneous with
relatively quick adjustment dynamics. Using this model, cointegration tests detect a single equilibrium
relation at conventional levels of significance using both annual and quarterly data. Testing confirms
that all data are non-stationary [I(1)] processes and the statistical significance of each variable in the
equilibrium relation (see Appendix for details).
Table 1 reports the long-run (β parameters of the equilibrium relationship for each of the possible
normalisations and the associated adjustment coefficients (α Considering first the estimates based on
annual data, ceteris paribus estimates of the long-run coefficients suggest that domestic borrowing is
positively related to government spending and negatively related to aid and tax revenue (the first row),
these relationships being signed in accordance with fiscal equilibrium. The coefficients on tax revenue
are larger, suggesting that in the long-run the budget is driven by tax revenue (or domestic revenue in
general) more than by aid. This is consistent with the donor measure of aid overstating what is
recorded in the budget (the fiscal variables are more strongly related to the known level of tax).
The estimated coefficient for the effect of aid on spending (0.61) for the annual data suggests that
less than two-thirds of aid contributed to spending; as the measure overstates aid this must be
interpreted with care, but is plausible and is consistent with aid being fully additional if at least
one-third of the donor measure was not recorded in the budget. Tax revenue has a large coefficient on
spending (2.17), suggesting that spending over-responds to tax. This is consistent with over-optimism
regarding the sustainability of tax increases: the government commits to spend expected revenue and if
this is not realised resorts to deficit financing (as noted in Section 2, budget planning was based on a
target deficit given revenue expectations so the latter may have been optimistic). This suggests poor
budget management. Aid and revenue appear to be negatively related, although an increase in R has a
much greater effect in reducing A than an increase in A would have in reducing R. This is consistent
with the need for aid declining as domestic revenue increases.
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The α coefficients suggest that spending, revenue and aid adjust to disequilibrium. The result on aid
is consistent with Ugandan fiscal planners having a target for aid revenue that was incorporated into
fiscal planning (in line with the theory in Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998). Killick and Foster (2007)
note that Uganda had a forward-looking view and achieved some success in getting more aid allocated
as budget support and released early in the budget year. It could be the case that donors incorporated
government spending in deciding how much aid to allocate to Uganda (G is associated with a more
than proportional increase in A). This does not imply that the government has control over the aid
allocated to Uganda by donors (aid commitments) but rather that disbursement could be a reaction to
government’s ability to meet donor administrative requirements and/or other policy pre-conditions
(Eifert & Gelb, 2005). The relatively large trend terms may be due to measurement error, such as in the
donor measure of aid (a significant overestimate), or trend behaviour in omitted variables.1
The quarterly data give similar qualitative results but with some notable differences in coefficients.
The β coefficients on aid and tax are quite similar and the coefficients on the trend terms are much
smaller (consistent with more accurate measurement and less importance of omitted variables).2 About
75 per cent of aid contributed to spending. As this measure still includes project aid and not all of this
will be included directly as government spending there is no implication that aid has not been
additional. Indeed, it is consistent with fully additional aid as over the period 1994–2004 on average,
no more than 75 per cent of aid disbursements reported by donors appeared in the budget
(Brownbridge, 2010, p. 280–1). The coefficient on tax of 0.88 is only slightly larger and is consistent
with improvements in budget management as there is no tendency to overspend. Turning to the
adjustment coefficients (α) the results from the quarterly model suggest that although tax and
borrowing adjust quite quickly to disequilibrium, this is not evident for aid or spending, perhaps
because the budget cycle is annual. Moreover, government borrowing appears to be making the
greatest adjustment, and indicates overshooting quarter-on-quarter, again reflecting the annual nature
Table 1. Long-run estimates for different normalisations of the fiscal equilibrium
Panel A: Annual Data (1972–2008, N = 30)
Coefficients of Cointegrating relationship (β)
DB G A R Trend
−1.000 0.223 −0.137 −0.484 244.387
4.485 −1.000 0.614 2.171 −1096.07
−7.31 1.63 −1.000 −3.538 1786.46
−2.066 (5.234) 0.461 (3.159) −0.283 (2.064) −1.000 (4.929) 504.932 (4.638)
Adjustment coefficients (α)
−0.252 (−1.890) −0.756 (−3.010) 0.760 (2.081) 0.677 (3.362)
Panel B: Quarterly Aid Data (1997q3–2014q4, N = 39)
Coefficients of Cointegrating relationship (β)
DB G A R Trend
−1.000 0.448 −0.334 −0.396 6.815
2.234 −1.000 0.746 0.884 −15.228
−2.994 1.340 −1.000 −1.184 20.407
−2.525 (7.838) 1.131 (4.610) −0.843 (7.322) −1.000 (2.693) 17.210 (3.065)
Adjustment coefficients (α)
−1.639 (−5.652) −0.141 (−0.466) −0.032 (−0.192) 0.600 (5.092)
Notes: The rows of β represent alternative normalisations of the one cointegrating relationship estimated in annual
and quarterly data respectively (t-ratios in parentheses are identical irrespective of normalisation). The adjustment
coefficients (α are those obtained from normalising the cointegrating vector on DB.
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of budgeting. The fact that it is performing an important role in maintaining the fiscal balance is at
least consistent with improved budget management and recording of revenues. Interestingly, with the
annual data estimated over a longer period government borrowing adjusts more slowly suggesting that
deficits were structural in nature and deeply embedded in spending plans (consistent with the large
positive trend), in contrast to the results from the quarterly data estimated over more recent periods.
Overall, fiscal management does appear to have improved since the late 1990s. Domestic borrowing is
the main financing item in the system for a primary budget deficit net of aid, and an increase in aid is
associated with lower domestic borrowing in the long-run.
The supplementary hypotheses tests are reported in Table 2 (the only differences between the annual
and quarterly data are slightly stronger rejection probabilities for the hypotheses). The aid spending
hypothesis is accepted, or more strictly cannot be rejected. Treating borrowing and revenue as
constant, aid leads to a corresponding increase in spending (even if not fully additional). The rejection
is weaker for the annual data, consistent with improved fiscal management and recording of aid since
the late 1990s. The balanced budget constraint is rejected, suggesting that domestically mobilised
resources are insufficient to cover government spending needs and that aid inflows are necessary to fill
this gap. Over the sample period (annual and quarterly) the government has relied on other borrowing
to balance its fiscal accounts. This is not surprising as non-aid borrowing is typically considered to be
financing of the last resort to finance an unanticipated gap between expenditure and revenue, and
could be affected by the way aid is provided or if actual aid disbursements fall short of what had been
programmed in the budget.
The hypothesis that aid displaces tax effort is rejected; there is no evidence that aid reduces tax
effort despite the negative association between aid and tax revenue (Table 1). Similarly, the hypothesis
that aid and domestic borrowing are substitutes is not supported and any substitution is not persistent.
Although not perfect substitutes, aid has supported better management of domestic borrowing so that
domestic borrowing in response to shortfalls in foreign aid is repaid when aid increases.
Bwire, Morrissey, and Lloyd (2013) estimate a similar model but decompose government spending
to investigate whether consumption and capital components of spending play different roles in the
budgetary equilibrium. Their results (reproduced in the Appendix) suggest they do. Specifically, there
is evidence that while borrowing is closely linked to capital spending, consumption spending may be
driven by tax revenue (as found for Ghana by Osei et al., 2005). This suggests that domestic
borrowing tends to be used to finance public investment whereas revenue (aid and tax) determines
recurrent spending, consistent with prudent budget policy.
Table 2. Hypotheses tests for fiscal effects of aid
Beta (β) Test Statistic
Hypotheses 1 2 3 4 d Annual Quarterly Inference
Aid Spending * −1 1 * 1 2.408 [0.121] 0.981 [0.322] Accept
Balanced Budget 0 −1 1 1 3 6.846 [0.009] 9.735 [0.002] Reject
Revenue displacement * * 1 −1 1 7.258 [0.027] 14.332 [0.001] Reject
Borrowing displacement −1 * 1 * 1 7.203 [0.027] 13.350 [0.001] Reject
Notes: Tests are based on Equation (3) with one normalisation (−1, which does not affect the likelihood) and d
restrictions (0 or 1, which do affect the likelihood) on the βcoefficients,where * denotes unrestricted (β5 on the
deterministic time trend is unrestricted to capture non-zero average linear growth rates). Inference is based on a χ2
(d) test reported under test statistics, with P-values in brackets.
Notes: Tests are based on Equation (3) with one normalisation (−1, which does not affect the likelihood) and d
restrictions (0 or 1, which do affect the likelihood) on the βcoefficients,where * denotes unrestricted (β5 on the
deterministic time trend is unrestricted to capture non-zero average linear growth rates). Inference is based on a χ2
(d) test reported under test statistics, with P-values in brackets.
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5. Conclusions and implications for policy
This paper assesses the dynamic relationship between aid and domestic fiscal variables in Uganda over
the period 1972 to 2014 using a cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) model with annual (1972–
2008) and quarterly (1997–2014) data. The analysis reflects features of the data in a period initially
characterised by political and economic instability, followed in the 1980s with effects of policy shifts
due to structural adjustment programmes and culminating in a sustained period of fiscal management
reform and consolidation since the mid-1990s. The analysis should be interpreted as capturing
primarily fiscal performance under the Museveni regime since 1987 (which encompasses over half
the annual data and all of the quarterly data). The investigation of the long-run relation among the
fiscal variables provides interesting insights into fiscal dynamics in Uganda. The existence of a budget
constraint in the form of a non-balanced budget excluding aid is supported. Thus, whilst aid flows to
Uganda have been substantial, the resource gap has remained large and often required domestic
borrowing (repaid when revenues are healthy). The evidence is consistent with a situation where the
government set spending targets and was quite successful in attracting aid to finance these targets. The
spending targets may have been ambitious (motivated to some extent by expectations of rising tax
revenue that were not realised) and aid was generally insufficient so there was frequent recourse to
borrowing.
Aid is a significant element of the long-run fiscal equilibrium and anticipated aid appears to have been
taken into account in budget planning. Ugandan budget planners may have had a target for aid revenue or
donors incorporated government spending in deciding how much aid to allocate to Uganda or a
combination of both. The analysis is consistent with the public financial management reforms during
the 1990s improving budget management so that the government set its spending targets according to its
own development objectives, and then found resources to finance these ambitions, in a priority order of
domestic revenue, aid and domestic borrowing. As improved public finance management and reduced
domestic borrowing are common policy conditions attached to aid, the results suggest that aid was either
associated with or caused beneficial fiscal policy responses in Uganda.
Aid was associated with increased tax effort, lower domestic borrowing and increased public
spending. Although the results suggest that spending increased by less than the amount of aid, this
is most probably because the donor measure overstates the amount of aid actually received by the
government. Using the quarterly data, about three-quarters of aid finances recorded spending, con-
sistent with evidence that about a quarter of aid (mostly project aid) was not recorded in the budget
during the 2000s. It is evident that spending was higher than it could have been in the absence of aid.
As tax revenue relative to GDP rose only gradually over the period (and shocks to tax had only
transitory effects), the government was unable to maintain a budget balance including aid so borrow-
ing was frequent. The analysis here considers only domestic borrowing from the banking sector so a
fruitful avenue for future research is to incorporate other forms of borrowing.
The results suggest some policy implications. The most important is the evidence that the introduc-
tion of better expenditure management through the MTEF and associated measures in addition to
better recording of aid inflows that finance public goods and services has been associated with
improved budget management. Aid is now a less important source of revenue than it was in the
1990s, but remains significant. There is evident scope to improve further the accuracy of recording aid
in the budget and increasing donor coordination to ensure that aid disbursements are predictable.
Unpredictable revenues, aid or tax, remain a challenge because ‘the reality of budgeting in countries
such as Uganda is that there is very little flexibility in the budget to reallocate funds to meet strategic
priorities or accommodate fiscal shocks’ (Brownbridge, 2010, p. 286). Uganda has shown an ability to
integrate aid into improved budget and expenditure management so it remains a deserving candidate
for budget support as this makes it easier for the government to pool resources and plan accordingly.
Continued efforts by donors to coordinate aid delivery systems, make aid more transparent and support
the improvement in government fiscal statistics would all contribute to improving fiscal planning.
Recipients need to know how much aid is available to finance spending and how this is delivered
through donor projects or government budgets.
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The evidence suggests that donors need not be concerned that aid reduced tax effort. Mobilising
domestic revenue remains a challenge because of the low tax base. The main distortionary taxes, tariffs on
imports and export taxes, were reduced significantly under trade liberalisation since the mid-1990s; at first
this would be expected to reduce tax/GDP ratios (given initial high dependence on trade taxes) but over
time revenues could increase, either because of a trade response (such as increased imports with lower
evasion so revenue rises) or substitution with other taxes. The slow growth of the private sector, and
especially wage employment, has limited growth in the effective income tax base. Donors can assist with
tax administration reforms to improve collection efficiency, but if Uganda is to reduce aid dependence,
growth in private sector incomes and employment is essential to facilitate an increase in tax revenue.
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Notes
1. Aid permits lower domestic borrowing and in the long-run may have been used to offset domestic borrowing. Note that this is
a ceteris paribus finding (holding other variables constant) and does not imply a trend decline in borrowing. Indeed, the
magnitude of the trend term for DB (Table 1) suggests a tendency to increase, although this is not evident in Figure 1. The
fact that the trend for the aid normalisation is the largest in magnitude is consistent with measurement error in the annual aid
series (given the other included variables, aid appears to be increasing ‘too much’). While trend terms are not easily
interpreted in the ceteris paribus context, the negative trend for G and positive trend for R indicate the effect of omitted
financing or revenue variables (necessary to avoid estimating an identity).
2. The quarterly data suggest some improvement in financing (the trend terms are all much smaller), although fiscal deficits and
the government’s domestic financing requirement have been rising since the mid-2000s as the share of donor aid in the budget
resource envelope has fallen. While the government is subject to ceilings on its net domestic financing (under the IMF
supported programmes), prior to 2012/13 the Bank of Uganda (BOU) also issued government securities, through primary
auctions, to mop up the liquidity needed to meet its reserve money targets so that the size of domestic financing was an
outcome of the interaction of the needs of monetary and fiscal policies. It is impossible to distinguish where fiscal policy, in
terms of its financing needs, ended and where monetary policy began. Since the start of the 2012/13 fiscal year, the primary
issues of government securities are only used for mobilising finance for the budget. Monetary policy is now conducted on the
secondary market, through issuing repurchase or reverse repurchase operations and, more occasionally, through secondary
market sales of the BOU’s own holdings of Government securities. Although it is now possible to distinguish clearly between
fiscal and monetary policy operations, the estimated relationship omits other financing and does not capture the effects (even
if they can be inferred).
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Appendix
1. CVAR specification
The testing procedures for the CVARmodel (Equation (1) in the text) are detailed here. The lag length is determined as
the minimum number of lags that meets the crucial assumption of time independence of the residuals, based on a
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, starting with two lags for annual data and five lags for quarterly data. Both Schwarz and
Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggest one lag for annual data, and with a lag of one the LM test does not reject the
null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals (Table A1). For quarterly data, while Schwarz information
criteria favours one lag, Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggest four lags. However, with three lags, the LM test
could not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals (Table A1).The analysis is implemented with
a lag of one for annual data and three lags for quarterly data.
Having determined the appropriate specification of the data generating process (DGP), cointegration rank is
determined using Johansen’s trace statistic, shown in Table A2. The trace tests support a cointegrating relation
without dummies. An assessment of the system residual misspecification test reveals that the residuals are not
auto-correlated. The determination of the cointegrating rank, r, relies on a top-to-bottom sequential procedure; this
is asymptotically more correct than the bottom-to-top Max-Eigen statistic alternative (Juselius, 2006, p. 131–4).
The trace-test has been shown to have finite sample bias with the implication that it often indicates too many
cointegrating relations so that the test is over-sized (Juselius, 2006, p. 140–2). For a small sample such as used
here the Bartlett correction for a small sample ensures a correct test size. Tests support the presence of one
equilibrium (stationary) relationship corrected for small sample bias and a rank of one (r = 1) is supported by the
data (Table A2). The results in Table 1 of the paper confirm that all variables are part of the long-run equilibrium
(long-run exclusion tests support this (available on request).The stationarity of each variable by itself in the system
is rejected, suggesting that the series are unit root non-stationary (Table A3).
1.1. Disaggregated spending
The long-run relation reported so far assumes that all forms of public spending have an equal effect on the other items in
the budget. Bwire et al. (2013, p. 20) investigate this by disaggregating total spending into current consumption (GC)
and development (GK) spending and report the long-run estimates for the annual data only (t-ratios in parentheses):
DB ¼ 1:43GK  0:11GC  0:27A 0:54Rþ 365:9Trend
5:029ð Þ 1:376ð Þ 3:676ð Þ 5:571ð Þ 9:109ð Þ (A1)
As with the aggregate results reported in the main text, estimates from Equation (A1) suggest that aid and tax
revenue are negatively related to domestic borrowing. Coefficients on capital and consumption spending are
opposite in sign suggesting they play distinct roles in the budget. Whereas domestic borrowing rises with capital
spending, (echoing the result from the aggregate model), current spending does not increase DB. This seemingly
counterintuitive result is consistent with the notion that government consumption adjusts to capital spending to
maintain the budgetary equilibrium (although the t ratio indicates that this is not statistically significant at
conventional levels), or that it is driven by aid and tax revenues. Importantly, these results imply that capital and
consumption spending play distinct and possibly offsetting roles in the budget; the hypothesis that the GC and GK
coefficients in Equation (A1) are equal is not supported (χ2(5) = 26.774 [0.000]).
Table A1. Lag length determination
Annual Sample: 1974:01 to 2008:01
Model k T Regr SC H-Q LM(1)
VAR(2) 2 35 10 61.241 60.077 0.333
VAR(1) 1 35 6 60.619 59.92 0.329
Quarterly Effective Sample: 1999:01 to 2014:01
VAR(5) 5 46 22 39.657 37.47 0.229
VAR(4) 4 46 18 39.106 37.316 0.364
VAR(3) 3 46 14 38.815 37.422 0.11
VAR(2) 2 46 10 38.603 37.608 0.014
VAR(1) 1 46 6 38.527 37.931 0.005
Notes: Column headings k refers to number of lags; T the length of time series; Regr is the number of regressors
(lags, constant and trend) in the model; SC the Schwarz Criterion; H-Q the Hannan-Quinn Criterion; and LM(1) is
the LM-Test for autocorrelation of order 1.
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Table A2. Johansen’s cointegration trace test results
Annual aid data (1972–2008)
p-r r Eig.value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-value P-value*
4 0 0.521 66.002 61.916 63.659 0.031 0.070
3 1 0.413 39.535 37.835 42.770 0.104 0.148
2 2 0.303 20.368 19.854 25.731 0.211 0.238
1 3 0.185 7.374 7.310 12.448 0.316 0.323
Quarterly aid data (1997q3–2014q4)
p-r r Eig.value Trace Trace* Frac95 P-value P-value*
4 0 0.611 85.654 73.454 63.659 0.000 0.005
3 1 0.368 40.318 35.072 42.770 0.088 0.246
2 2 0.218 18.261 16.198 25.731 0.334 0.485
1 3 0.126 6.449 1.972 12.448 0.416 0.956
Notes:Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend restricted; *: The small sample corrected test statistic (Dennis
et al., 2006, p. 159–60); Frac95: The 5 per cent critical value of the test of H(r) against H(p). The critical values as
well as the p-values are approximated using the Gamma (Γ) distribution.
Table A3. Test for stationarity: χ2 (p-r)
DB G A R
7.710 (0.052) 7.882 (0.049) 8.334 (0.040) 7.389 (0.060)
Notes: Restricted trend included in the cointegrating relationship(s); 5 per cent C.V = 7.815; P-values in
parentheses.
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